UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

| Stacey Crane-Chaulk and Jeffrey Chaulk, | : Civil Action No.: |
|--|---------------------|
| Plaintiffs, | : |
| v. | : |
| Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, L.L.C.; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, | COMPLAINT |
| Defendants. | : : : |

For this Complaint, the Plaintiffs, Stacey Crane-Chaulk and Jeffrey Chaulk, by undersigned counsel, states as follows:

JURISDICTION

- 1. This action arises out of Defendants' repeated violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"), and the invasions of Plaintiff's personal privacy by the Defendants and its agents in their illegal efforts to collect a consumer debt.
 - 2. Supplemental jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
- 3. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), in that the Defendants transact business in this District and a substantial portion of the acts giving rise to this action occurred in this District.

PARTIES

4. The Plaintiffs, Stacey Crane-Chaulk ("Ms. Crane-Chaulk") and Jeffrey Chaulk ("Mr. Chaulk") (hereafter jointly the "Plaintiffs"), are married, adult individuals residing in

residing in Northborough, Massachusetts, and are "consumers" as the term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

- 5. Defendant, Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, L.L.C. ("Leading"), is an Illinois business entity with an address of 5440 North Cumberland Avenue, Suite 300, Chicago, Illinois 60656-1490, operating as a collection agency, and is a "debt collector" as the term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
- 6. Does 1-10 (the "Collectors") are individual collectors employed by Leading and whose identities are currently unknown to the Plaintiff. One or more of the Collectors may be joined as parties once their identities are disclosed through discovery.
 - 7. Leading at all times acted by and through one or more of the Collectors.

ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS

A. The Debt

- 8. The Plaintiffs incurred a financial obligation (the "Debt") to a creditor (the "Creditor").
- 9. The Debt arose from services provided by the Creditor which were primarily for family, personal or household purposes and which meets the definition of a "debt" under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
- 10. The Debt was purchased, assigned or transferred to Leading for collection, or Leading was employed by the Creditor to collect the Debt.
- 11. The Defendants attempted to collect the Debt and, as such, engaged in "communications" as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).

B. Leading Engages in Harassment and Abusive Tactics

- 12. The Defendants placed numerous telephone calls to the Plaintiffs in order to collect the Debt.
- 13. The Defendants informed Ms. Crane-Chaulk that she owed a debt. When she inquired whether the Defendants had any information pertaining to the Debt, the Defendants would not furnish her with any additional information.
- 14. The Defendants called the Ms. Crane-Chaulk's mother-in-law, an elderly woman, and Mr. Chaulk at his place of employment, in order to locate the Plaintiff.
- 15. The Defendants contacted Mr. Chaulk at his place of employment a number of times. The Defendants disclosed to Mr. Chaulk, information pertaining to the Debt.
- 16. Ms. Crane-Chaulk requested that the Defendants not contact her husband at his place of employment. The Defendants however, continued to do so.
 - 17. The Defendants used rude and abusive language while speaking to the Plaintiffs.
- 18. For instance, the Defendants stated to Ms. Crane-Chaulk that they would "go after" her husband and that they would "get the money" for payment of the Debt.
- 19. The Defendants were so rude and abusive to Ms. Crane-Chaulk that the Defendants brought her to tears.
- 20. The Defendants would not disclose the identity of the collection agency during telephone communications with the Plaintiffs.
- 21. The Defendants, in placing their telephone calls to the Plaintiffs' home residence, placed repeated calls to the Plaintiffs in an annoying and harassing manner. The Defendants would hang up the phone without leaving a message.

22. The Defendants did not provide the Plaintiffs with a validation notice explaining her rights under state and federal law, or her right to dispute the Debt.

C. Plaintiffs Suffered Actual Damages

- 23. The Plaintiffs have suffered and continues to suffer actual damages as a result of the Defendants' unlawful conduct.
- 24. As a direct consequence of the Defendants' acts, practices and conduct, the Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer from humiliation, anger, anxiety, emotional distress, fear, frustration and embarrassment.
- 25. The Defendants' conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

COUNT I VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.

- 26. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 27. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2) in that Defendants informed third parties of the nature of the Plaintiffs' debt and stated that the Plaintiff owed a debt.
- 28. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(3) in that Defendants contacted third parties in regards to the Plaintiffs' debt on numerous occasions, without being asked to do so.

- 29. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) in that Defendants communicated with individuals other than the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs' attorney, or a credit bureau.
- 30. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2) in that Defendants used profane and abusive language when speaking with the consumer.
- 31. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) in that Defendants caused a phone to ring repeatedly and engaged the Plaintiffs in telephone conversations, with the intent to annoy and harass.
- 32. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) in that Defendants placed calls to the Plaintiffs without disclosing the identity of the debt collection agency.
- 33. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) in that Defendants employed false and deceptive means to collect a debt.
- 34. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) in that Defendants failed to send the Plaintiffs a validation notice stating the amount of the Debt.
- 35. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) in that Defendants failed to send the Plaintiffs a validation notice stating the name of the original creditor to whom the Debt was owed.
- 36. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) in that Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice stating the Plaintiff's right to dispute the Debt within thirty days.
- 37. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) in that Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice informing the Plaintiff of a right to have verification and judgment mailed to the Plaintiff.

- 38. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) in that Defendants failed to send the Plaintiff a validation notice containing the name and address of the original creditor.
- 39. The Defendants' conduct violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) in that Defendants continued collection efforts even though the Debt had not been validated.
- 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the FDCPA, including every one of the above-cited provisions.
 - 41. The Plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of Defendants' violations.

COUNT II VIOLATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, M.G.L. c. 93A § 2, et seq.

- 42. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 43. The Defendants employed unfair or deceptive acts to collect the Debt, in violation of M.G.L. c. 93A § 2.
- 44. Defendant's failure to comply with these provisions constitutes an unfair or deceptive act under M.G.L. c. 93A § 9 and, as such, the Plaintiffs are entitled to double or treble damages plus reasonable attorney's fees.

COUNT III INVASION OF PRIVACY BY INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION

- 45. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 46. The Restatement of Torts, Second, § 652(b) defines intrusion upon seclusion as, "One who intentionally intrudes…upon the solitude or seclusion of another, or his private affairs

or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."

- 47. Massachusetts further recognizes the Plaintiffs' right to be free from invasions of privacy, thus Defendant violated Massachusetts state law.
- 48. The Defendants intentionally intruded upon Plaintiffs' right to privacy by continually harassing the Plaintiffs with numerous telephone calls.
- 49. The telephone calls made by Defendants to the Plaintiffs were so persistent and repeated with such frequency as to be considered, "hounding the plaintiff," and, "a substantial burden to her existence," thus satisfying the Restatement of Torts, Second, § 652(b) requirement for an invasion of privacy.
- 50. The conduct of the Defendants in engaging in the illegal collection activities resulted in multiple invasions of privacy in such a way as would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person.
- 51. As a result of the intrusions and invasions, the Plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial from Defendants.
- 52. All acts of Defendants and its agents were committed with malice, intent, wantonness, and recklessness, and as such, Defendants are subject to punitive damages.

COUNT IV INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 53. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length.
- 54. The acts, practices and conduct engaged in by the Defendants vis-à-vis the Plaintiffs was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

- 55. The foregoing conduct constitutes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress under the laws of the State of Massachusetts.
- 56. All acts of Defendants and the Collectors complained of herein were committed with malice, intent, wantonness, and recklessness, and as such, Defendants are subject to imposition of punitive damages.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray that judgment be entered against Defendants:

- 1. Actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1) against Defendants;
- Statutory damages of \$1,000.00 for each violation pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
 \$1692k(a)(2)(A) against Defendants;
- 3. Costs of litigation and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C.§ 1692k(a)(3) against Defendants;
- 4. Double or treble damages plus reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to M.G.L.c. 93A § 3(A);
- 5. Actual damages from Defendants for the all damages including emotional distress suffered as a result of the intentional, reckless, and/or negligent FDCPA violations and intentional, reckless, and/or negligent invasions of privacy in an amount to be determined at trial for the Plaintiffs;
- 6. Punitive damages; and
- 7. Such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

TRIAL BY JURY DEMANDED ON ALL COUNTS

Dated: June 3, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Sergei Lemberg
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